When Trump encourages his supporters to attack protesters and the media at his rally’s…
That is criminal.
Trump threatens riots if he’s not nominated. Let’s let the courts decide if this is politically protected speech
Donald Trump is a domestic terrorist. That assertion rests on two pillars: a definition and a pattern of facts.
In the definitions of terrorism, the common elements are the use of violence or the threat of violence to coerce or intimidate other people for political purposes.
It is widely recognized that Trump’s repeated incitements during campaign speeches are out of bounds.
He laments that his followers cannot follow the practice of older days when protesters were carried out of political meetings on stretchers. He expresses regret that he cannot punch protesters in the face. While he may not have engaged in violence himself, his inflammatory comments are virtual invitations for others to do so on his behalf — witness his campaign manager’s arrest for assault.
TIME TO INVOKE THE LAW?
Trump, of course, denies that he wishes to incite violence, exploiting the broad latitude for free speech under the first amendment. Yet, the context for assessing incitement has changed profoundly in recent years. There are ample grounds for seeking a fresh judicial review of what constitutes incitement in today’s circumstances.
The core principles on which the Supreme Court has relied stem from a distinction first made by then-Federal District Court Judge Learned Hand in 1917, namely that, to be prosecutable, language must be a “trigger to action” rather than “a key to persuasion”.
When Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes declared in 1919 that no one had the right to shout fire in a crowded theater, he added that the question was one of “proximity and degree”, that is, there must be a “clear and present danger” to public order.
In 1969, this precedent was tightened as the Supreme Court linked judgment about whether inflammatory statements tend to incite unlawful action to a verdict that such action is likely and imminent.
The court revised its earlier interpretations, now declaring that
…the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.
An admirable standard, but one open to reasonable refinement….More Here…